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Attorney ethics are complicated in the sense that there are a multitude
of sources that propound information regarding attorney ethics and a
general lack of uniformity amongst them. Lawyers are guided primarily by
three sources: the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (hereinafter “Model Rules”), the laws of the state in which the
lawyer practices, and the individual attorney’s “moral compass.”1
Attorney compliance with the ethical boundaries proscribed by the
American Bar Association (hereinafter “ABA”) is largely self-imposed,
while the courts retain the ultimate enforcement authority.2 The ABA
Model Rules are only a loose framework; they are not an exhaustive code
featuring the answer to every possible ethical dilemma an attorney might
face.3 As a result, attorneys must go beyond the Rules to answer difficult,
“grey area” questions in which the ABA Model Rules are silent.4
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal ethics question this comment seeks to shed light upon
concerns the topic of surreptitious recordings, specifically the ethics
invoked where an attorney surreptitiously records their client. This
comment will discuss and analyze whether it is ethical for an attorney to
surreptitiously record their clients, and if it is, under what circumstances.
This comment is divided into multiple sections. Section II provides
relevant background information on the topic. Section III of this comment
analyzes the two ABA Model Rules that are most pertinent to the issue:
Rule 1.6 concerning the Duty of Confidentiality and Rule 8.4 concerning
Attorney Misconduct. Section IV of this comment provides a historical
guide on how the ABA has approached surreptitious recordings and their
current opinion on the topic. Section V highlights how different
jurisdictions approach the issue. Section VI provides analysis of Sections
III-V and the ethical issue of surreptitious recording. Finally, Section VII
proposes possible solutions to the issue of surreptitious recording.
More specifically, this comment focuses on the ethical issues
surrounding single-party consent jurisdictions. In such jurisdictions, only
one party to a conversation needs to consent to a recording for said

1

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
3
Id.
4
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GOVERNMENT & PUBLIC SECTOR LAWYERS: ETHICS:
PUBLIC
LAWYERS
AND
ETHICAL
DILEMMAS,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/resources/ethics/ (last visited Sept.
28, 2019).
2
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recording to be legal.5 In a single-party jurisdiction, an attorney taping the
conversation could provide his or her “consent” to such taping thus making
the recording legal. Alternatively, if an attorney were to record a client
surreptitiously in a two-party consent jurisdiction they are necessarily
breaking the law, thereby violating Model Rule 8.4(b), which states that it
is attorney misconduct to willfully break the law.6 Therefore, this comment
focuses on recording in a single-party consent jurisdiction, where the ethics
of surreptitious recording are murkier and unclear. This comment argues
that surreptitious recording of clients is extremely problematic, mostly
unethical, and should only be done in rare, specific circumstances after the
attorney has weighed the potential consequences to all involved parties.
II. BACKGROUND
The recent controversy involving President Donald J. Trump and his
former personal attorney, Michael Cohen, prompted this comment. Cohen
worked for the Trump Organization (hereinafter “Organization”) beginning
in 2007, quickly earning a reputation as a fixer and assuming different roles
in the Organization.7 Cohen was instrumental in guiding then candidate
Trump through the primaries and general election during the 2016
presidential campaign.8 Prior to the general election, Cohen’s guidance led
to the campaign distributing payments to women who alleged they had
extramarital affairs with Trump.9 These payments were made to keep the
women from further discussing their allegations with the press.10 Despite
Cohen’s efforts, news of these payments eventually leaked.11 As media
stories of the payments developed, many sources speculated that Trump
5
MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., Laws on Recording Conversations in all 50
States,
https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/RECORDINGCONVERSATIONS-CHART.pdf (last visited November 20, 2019).
6
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
7
William K. Rashbaum, Danny Hakim, Brian M. Rosenthal, Emily Flitter & Jesse
Drucker, How Michael Cohen, Trump’s Fixer, Built a Shadowy Business Empire, THE NEW
YORK TIMES (May 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/05/business/michael-cohenlawyer-trump.html.
8
Id.
9
Rebecca Ballhaus & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Denies Knowledge of $130,000 Payment
to
Stormy
Daniels,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(April
5,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-denies-knowledge-of-130-000-payment-to-formerporn-star-1522963827.
10
See Id. Although Trump originally claimed that he had no personal involvement in
payments to Stormy Daniels, he later acknowledged that he had indeed given a retainer to
Cohen to offset his personal costs.
11
Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Lawyer Arranged $130,000 Payment for
Adult-Film
Star’s
Silence,
WALL
STREET
JOURNAL
(Jan.
12,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-lawyer-arranged-130-000-payment-for-adult-film-starssilence-1515787678.
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was directly involved in making the payments; however, no concrete
evidence surfaced to confirm their suspicions.12 Trump adamantly
maintained he had no connection to the payments and denied any direct
involvement in them.13
In early April 2018, Cohen’s office and home were raided by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in furtherance of the United States
Department of Justice’s investigation into potential Russian interference
and collusion in the 2016 Presidential Election.14 The FBI seized numerous
records and documents, including those relating to a payment made to
former adult film actress Stephanie Clifford, professionally known as
Stormy Daniels.15 Some of the records seized in the raids suggested that
Trump and Cohen attempted to purchase former Playboy Playmate Karen
McDougal’s publishing rights from American Media Incorporated.16
Of particular importance to this discussion is the medium the evidence
seized by the FBI was in.17 Rather than traditional written records such as
personal notes or memos, the FBI found secret recordings Cohen took of
conversations with his client, Donald Trump.18 After the existence of these
recordings became public knowledge, Cohen acknowledged that he
habitually taped his clients rather than taking traditional handwritten
notes.19 Trump was unaware that his attorney had recorded their
discussions about the payments and was understandably not happy when
this information came to light.20
12
See Rebecca Ballhaus & Joe Palazzolo, Trump Denies Knowledge of $130,000
Payment to Stormy Daniels, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 5, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-denies-knowledge-of-130-000-payment-to-formerporn-star-1522963827.
13
Id.
14
Erica Orden, Rebecca Ballhaus & Michael Rothfeld, Agents Raid Office of Trump
Lawyer Michael Cohen in Connection with Stormy Daniels Payments, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (April 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-raids-trump-lawyers-office1523306297.
15
Id.
16
Rebecca Ballhaus, Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo, Michael Cohen Taped
Conversation with Trump about Buying Rights to Playmate’s Story, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(July 20, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/michael-cohen-taped-conversation-withtrump-about-buying-rights-to-playmates-story-1532112954 (American Media Inc. owned
the rights to Karen McDougal’s story claiming that she had an extramarital affair with
Trump. Candidate Trump and Michael Cohen were discussing how to purchase the rights.).
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Deanna Paul, Michael Cohen Secretly Tape-Recorded Trump. Does that make him a
Bad
Lawyer?
WASHINGTON
POST
(July
26,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/07/25/michael-cohen-secretlyrecorded-trump-does-that-make-him-a-bad-lawyer/?utm_term=.c6a27d93cf1a.
20
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25, 2018, 5:34 AM),
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The Trump-Cohen attorney-client relationship and its eventual
breakdown is a useful example that provides real world context to the
issues discussed in this comment. The Trump-Cohen fallout illustrates
potential consequences of surreptitiously recording clients. The decision to
use this example is not, and should not be understood as, supporting or
criticizing the Presidency. Rather, it is an opportunity to use a high-profile
example to further an ethics discussion.
III. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT IN THE CONTEXT OF SURREPTITIOUS RECORDINGS
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
are the current ethics rules which guide attorneys in the ethical practice of
law.21 The Model Rules provide a framework that nearly every legal
jurisdiction in the country has adopted; however, each state maintains the
ability to adopt or modify the Model Rules before enacting them within
their borders.22 The framework lays out the ethical obligations that all
attorneys owe to their clients, adversaries, and third parties.23 Although the
Model Rules do not discuss surreptitious recording, they do speak of the
Duty of Confidentiality and of Attorney Misconduct.24 This section
provides an overview of these topics and explains their relevance to the
issue of surreptitious recording.

https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1022097879253635072?lang=en. (“What kind of
lawyer would tape a client? So sad! Is this a first, never heard of it before? Why was the
tape so abruptly terminated (cut) while I was presumably saying positive things? I hear there
are other clients and many reporters that are taped – can this be so? Too bad!”); see also
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 21, 2018, 5:10 AM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1020642287725043712?lang=en.
(“Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer’s office (early in the
morning) – almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client –
totally unheard of & perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did
nothing wrong.”).
21
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, LAW OF
LAWYERING §1.03 SOURCES OF LAW CONSTITUTING THE LAW OF LAWYERING (4th ed., 2019-1
Supp. 2014).
22
LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: PRACTICE GUIDES, MISCONDUCT
AND DISCIPLINE, DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT. (North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia have
added to the definition of Rule 8.4(c) to prevent fraud if that conduct reflects adversely on
the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer).
23
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §2.01 THE CLIENT-LAWYER RELATIONSHIP: PART I OF THE
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
24
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
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A. American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4
ABA Model Rule 8.4 is an all-encompassing rule that requires
attorneys to obey all of the Model Rules.25 If an attorney violates any of
the Model Rules, they inherently also violate Rule 8.4.26 Although Rule
8.4 is extremely comprehensive and has many subsections addressing a
long list of scenarios, for the purposes of this comment it is only necessary
to focus on Rule 8.4(a), Rule 8.4(b) and Rule 8.4(c).27 Model Rule 8.4 is
relevant to this discussion because some jurisdictions have determined that
surreptitious recording is inherently deceitful, while other jurisdictions
have not.28 This will be addressed in more detail in Section V.
Rule 8.4(a) states that a lawyer shall not “violate or attempt to violate
the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to
do so, or do so through the acts of another.”29 Rule 8.4(b) states that a
lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct that adversely reflects “on the
lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.”30 Rule 8.4(c)
states that an attorney shall not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”31 This Model Rule not only applies to
the attorney’s professional practice, but also applies to their actions outside
the practice of law.32 This highlights the fact that attorneys must be
cognizant of ethical conduct both within and outside of their practice, as
they are held to a higher standard of conduct in society than an ordinary
citizen.33 Following this logic, in a single-party consent jurisdiction an
ordinary citizen could secretly tape conversations without serious
consequences, while attorneys may be subject to punishment for similar
actions.

25

HAZARD, supra note 21, at §69.02 OVERVIEW.
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §69.03 VIOLATION OF A RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
AS MISCONDUCT.
27
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
28
See discussion infra Section V.
29
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
30
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
31
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
32
See Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 976 A.2d 245, 261 (Md. 2009) (stating
that Rule 8.4(c) can be violated even if the conduct occurred outside of the practice of law);
see also In re Pugh, 710 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 2006) (disciplining lawyer under rule 8.4(c) for
embezzling funds from his real estate closing company); see generally In re Ellis, 204 P.3d
1161 (Kan. 2009) (disciplining lawyer for stealing food from the office cafeteria and lying
about it when asked by superiors).
33
See e.g., Johnson, 976 A.2d at 261.
26
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B. American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6
ABA Model Rule 1.6 concerns the confidentiality of information
between an attorney and client.34 An obligation exists for attorneys to
preserve client confidences, prevent disclosure of information about a
client, and prohibits use such information in the adverse interest of a
client.35 The Rule prevents attorneys from voluntarily discussing or giving
information about a client to anyone.36 Model Rule 1.6(a) concerns a broad
category of information “relating to the representation of a client” that is
prohibited from disclosure, and therefore, an attorney must not reveal it.37
Model Rule 1.6(b) contains a list of exceptions, which permit a lawyer to
disclose information when a lawyer “reasonably believes” that disclosure is
necessary.38
The duty of confidentiality is the foundation of the attorney-client
relationship.39 The duty enables the attorney to gain the trust of clients and
serve them more effectively.40 It allows the client to fully engage in their
representation and enables them to be honest with their attorneys.41
However, this enhanced attorney-client relationship comes at a cost.42
Occasionally, an attorney learns information that would be useful or
beneficial to a third party; nonetheless, the attorney is not permitted to
disclose such information. Clients have legitimate expectations that the
information they disclose to their attorney will remain confidential.43 The
confidential relationship between attorney and client enhances client
autonomy and gives the client a sense that the legal system is capable of
fair play.44 Indeed Rule 1.6 is extremely relevant to the topic of
surreptitious recording of clients because the clients’s words, phrases, and
tone are recorded verbatim without their knowledge.45 Furthermore, secret
34

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.
36
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.
37
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2018).
38
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (2018); Prudential Ins. Co. of America
v. Massaro, 47 F. App’x 618, 619 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975
F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1992) (stating that the crime-fraud exception to both the duty of
confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege allows an attorney to disclose confidential
information in certain circumstances)).
39
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.
40
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.
41
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.
42
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
2000)
43
Id.
44
Albert Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client’s Confidences: One Value Among
Many or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 352 (1981).
45
See discussion infra Section IV. B.
35
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recording has the ability to destroy the trust and confidence a client has in
their attorney, and has the potential to harm the attorney-client relationship.
Section IV will explore these issues in greater detail.
IV. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S STANCE ON SURREPTITIOUS
RECORDING
The American Bar Association is one of the preeminent authorities in
the field of legal ethics.46 The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility
houses numerous committees that provide leadership in developing and
interpreting scholarly sources in the field of legal ethics.47 The ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (hereinafter
“Committee”) exists to answer important ethical questions and help
interpret state-adopted Rules of Professional Conduct.48 The Committee
provides this guidance through of written opinions.49 The Committee
promulgates two types of opinions: Formal Opinions and Informal
Opinions.50 Formal Opinions address matters that are of interest to both the
general public and the bar.51 Informal Opinions address specific inquiries
and a particular set of facts.52 However, like the Model Rules themselves,
these opinions are advisory, and thus not binding.53 Nonetheless, ABA
ethics opinions are cited frequently by courts as they assist with
interpretation of the Model Rules.54 The ABA has issued a handful of
46
GEORGETOWN
LAW
LIBRARY,
LEGAL
ETHICS
RESEARCH
GUIDE,
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/legal_ethics (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
47
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/ (last visited
Nov. 20, 2019) (The Center for Professional Responsibility engages in fields such as
professional regulation, professionalism, and client protection).
48
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/
ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). Note that the committee
currently known as the Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility was formerly
known as the Committee on Professional Ethics from 1958 through 1971, the committees
are for all intents and purposes functional equivalents and for the purposes of this comment
will be collectively referred to as one and the same, hereinafter “Committee”.
49
GEORGETOWN
LAW
LIBRARY,
LEGAL
ETHICS
RESEARCH
GUIDE,
https://guides.ll.georgetown.edu/legal_ethics (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/
ethicsandprofessionalresponsibility/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
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opinions discussing attorneys and their surreptitious recordings of clients,
adversaries, and third parties.55 This section will outline their holdings and
show how the ABA’s stance has evolved over time.
A. ABA Informal Opinion 1008
In 1967, the Committee issued ABA Informal Opinion 1008, titled
“Lawyer Tape Recording Telephone Conversation of Client Without
Client’s Knowledge.”56
In addressing the question presented, the
Committee divided the problem into two separate issues: (1) is it
permissible for an attorney to tape a conversation with a client, when the
client is unaware that the conversation is being recorded?; and (2) does the
disclosure of the recording’s substance conform with the ethical rules?57
In addressing the first issue, the Committee noted that a particular
jurisdiction may have a statute prohibiting the taping of a conversation
without the consent of all parties.58 The opinion then referenced Formal
Opinion 7 and Informal Opinion 262.59 These ethics opinions suggest that
attorneys must be candid with their clients, and therefore recording a
telephone conversation without the client’s knowledge could potentially
violate this requirement.
Informal Opinion 1008 extended this principle to the surreptitious
recordings of clients.60 The Committee concluded that an attorney who
wishes to record a conversation with a client must first alert the client that
they intend to record the conversation.61 It stated that if the attorney did
not obtain the client’s consent, the attorney could not ethically record the
conversation.62 Such a recording would be a violation of the obligation of
candor and fairness.63
In addressing the second issue of disclosure, the Committee stated that
an attorney must not disclose the substance of the recording as it would
invoke the attorney-client privilege and the fact that an attorney has an
obligation to maintain their client’s confidences.64 In sum, the Committee
recognized that an attorney must not secretly record a conversation with a
client, that the attorney must alert the client if they plan to record the

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

See discussion infra Section IV. A, B, C.
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967).
Id.
Id.
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conversation, and that the attorney must not disclose any substance of said
recording, as the attorney has a duty to protect the client’s confidences.
B. ABA Formal Opinion 337
In 1974, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 337, which reiterated the conclusion
previously reached by the Committee in Informal Opinion 1008.65 The
ABA wrote Formal Opinion 337 to address the technological advancements
in recording devices and their use by individuals in the legal profession.66
The Opinion addressed whether it was ethical for an attorney to secretly
record three different groups of people: (1) clients, (2) other attorneys and
adversaries, and (3) third parties.67 Affirming Informal Opinion 1008, the
Committee advised that it is unethical for an attorney to surreptitiously
record their own clients or adversaries.68 The Committee emphasized that
an attorney who wished to ethically record a conversation must alert all
parties to the conversation.69
The Committee had difficulty, however, in answering whether
recording third parties is permissible.70 After contemplating the question,
the Committee determined that except in exceptional circumstances, it is
both impermissible and unethical for an attorney to secretly record a third
party without their knowledge.71
The Committee acknowledged that third party recording would
disrupt public confidence in the legal profession and emphasized the need
for the public to trust attorneys.72 It also stated that secret tapings would
violate Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
expressed the idea that attorneys must avoid professional impropriety.73

65

ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
Id.
67
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974) (explaining
that the Committee made an exception that permits a prosecutor or an Attorney General to
surreptitiously record a client if the recording adheres strictly to the Constitutional
requirements. However, the Committee also made clear that even though a recording may
theoretically be legal, it does not per se make the recording ethical. The Committee allowed
leeway for unethical behavior from governmental attorneys in specific circumstances. The
Committee declined to outline specific instances in which this behavior would be
permissible.).
72
Id.
73
Id.; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
66
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Lastly, the Committee advised that an attorney who secretly tapes
another individual would be in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4)
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.74 Disciplinary Rule 1102(A)(4) states, “A lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”75
The ethical rules in combination with the public perception of
attorneys prompted the Committee to ultimately advise against all secret
tape recordings.76 Thus a broad and sweeping per se rule that disapproved
of all secret tapings, irrespective of identity of those involved in the
conversation was promulgated by the Committee.77
C. The ABA’s Current Stance: Formal Opinion 01-422
Formal Opinion 337 stood untouched for nearly 30 years until 2001,
when the Committee revisited the topic.78 Formal Opinion 01-422 marked
a dramatic change in course from the previously longstanding precedent set
by Formal Opinion 337.79
The Committee shifted its longstanding stance and advised that
surreptitious recording is not deceitful.80 In Formal Opinion 01-422, the
Committee asserted that the act of surreptitiously recording a conversation
without consent of the other parties does not violate the Model Rules,
unless the recording occurs in a jurisdiction that forbids such recording by
law.81 To commit an ethics violation in a single-party consent jurisdiction,
the act of recording needs to occur in conjunction with other independently
unethical behavior.82 Although the Committee did not affirmatively
advocate for attorneys to adopt the practice of surreptitious recording, it
also did not explicitly claim that to do so would be unethical, as the
Committee previously had in Formal Opinion 337.83

74
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974); MODEL
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
75
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
This is the predecessor to the current Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c), which states
that “a lawyer shall not [ . . . e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.”
76
ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 1008 (1967).
77
Id.
78
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 337 (1974).
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The Committee provided numerous reasons for the adoption of this
new standard. It noted that in 1983 the ABA adopted the new Model Rules
of Professional Conduct and updated their ethics rules.84 Some states and
bar associations claimed that Formal Opinion 337 did not align with the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and therefore, Opinion 337 was
outdated and inapplicable to the modern practice of law.85 The ABA
acknowledged that their opinions are merely advisory, rendering the
opinions non-binding on any state or jurisdiction.86 As a result, a lack of
consistency emerged among states. Some states, such as Mississippi,
adopted the standard, while other states such as Colorado, did not.87 Other
states, including Oklahoma, Utah, and Maine complained about Opinion
337 and advocated that the ABA reevaluate their stance on surreptitious
recordings.88
To add further confusion, there were intra-state bar association
disagreements on the ethics of surreptitious recording.89 For example, the
New York County Bar Association advised that lawyers could record a
conversation where the other party or parties did not consent.90
Conversely, the New York City Bar Association opined that lawyers should
not record other parties without their consent; however, it did suggest a
potential exception for attorneys conducting criminal investigations.91
Interestingly, neither of these bar association opinions matched the New
York State Bar Association’s stance, which condemned all recordings
unless all parties to the conversation are aware that their conversation is
being recorded.92
The states that heavily criticized Opinion 337 believed that the per se
rule forbidding secret recordings was too restrictive and demanded that
they be granted some discretion to draft and comply with the ethics opinion
to the extent it may be appropriate in their local practice.93 In response to
these issues, the ABA created a framework that each state can apply to
84

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001); see
generally, MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
85
Id. See discussion infra Section IV. C.
86
Id. (Explaining that some states simply chose not to follow Opinion 337 and ignored
the ABA’s advice).
87
Id.
88
Id. (Explaining that the states found the per se rule of Formal Opinion 337 to be too
stringent and said that only a surreptitious recording in combination with other deceptive
behavior is unethical.).
89
Id.
90
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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determine whether surreptitious recordings by attorneys are ethically
permissible.94
The first step in the framework is to ask whether the state or
jurisdiction has a law that forbids single-party consent recording.95 If a
state is an all-party consent state and an attorney records without
permission, the attorney in question likely violates Rules 8.4(b) and (c).96
If the state is a single-party consent state, the attorney must then use their
best judgment when recording their clients.97 The Committee advised that
secret recording should only occur where the attorney conducting such
recording knows that the client would accept and allow the recording to
occur.98 In deciding, the Committee did not actively support surreptitious
recordings; rather, it noted that it would prefer attorneys to be upfront and
honest with their clients, and advise them that they are recording a
conversation.99
V. INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ABA MODEL RULES
Nearly every state in the United States has adopted the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.100 The Model Rules
provide that “failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed
by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”101 Section 19 of
the Scope of the Model Rules states that a disciplinary body will analyze
the lawyer’s conduct based on the facts and circumstances that existed at
the time of the conduct at issue.102 This section lastly states that the
possibility and the severity of such discipline will be determined by the
following: the willfulness of the attorney’s conduct, the seriousness of the
breach, and the outside influences and extenuating factors involved in the

94

Id.
Id.
96
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b)-(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001).
97
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422 (2001).
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
American Bar Association, Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ (last visited November 16,
2019); The State Bar of California, Rules of Professional Conduct,
https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Attorneys/Conduct-Discipline/Rules/Rules-of-ProfessionalConduct (last visited November 16, 2019) (According to the ABA, California has not
adopted the Model Rules. However, California recently adopted new Rules of Professional
Conduct on November 1, 2018 that align the State with the ABA rules.).
101
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
102
Id.
95
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ethical violation.103 This section also highlights the fact that although the
ABA provides a general statement on how the Model Rules should be
applied, not all jurisdictions apply them uniformly. Instead, the Model
Rules are applied and interpreted at the state’s discretion; therefore, the
disciplinary outcomes are wildly different. For example, Cohen’s
surreptitious recording of his client could be ethical according to some
jurisdictions, while other jurisdictions would reprimand and sanction him
for such actions.104
A. Subjective Context Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Concerning surreptitious recordings, Mississippi can be considered a
“subjective” jurisdiction because the State does not have a per se rule
prohibiting attorneys from secretly recording their clients.105 Rather, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi tends to determine ethical violations on this
topic on a case-by-case basis.106 This individualized approach can be
described as one of pragmatism and flexibility, utilizing the “context-ofthe-circumstances” to resolve the matter before the court.107
In Attorney M v. Mississippi Bar, the Supreme Court of Mississippi
found that a plaintiff’s lawyer who surreptitiously recorded telephone
conversations with a potential defendant did not commit an ethical
violation.108 The issue arose during a medical malpractice case in which
Attorney M represented the plaintiff.109 During discovery, plaintiff’s
attorney telephoned “Dr. C” on two occasions, tape recording both of the
phone calls without Dr. C’s knowledge or permission.110 Testimony
revealed that Dr. C assumed that his conversations were recorded, but his
suspicions were not confirmed until Attorney M sent Dr. C a letter in the
mail informing the doctor of the recorded telephone conversations.111
The Mississippi State Bar filed a complaint against Attorney M after
his actions became public, alleging that his conduct violated the Mississippi
Rules of Professional Conduct.112 The Complaint Tribunal found that
103

Id.
Contra discussion infra Section V. A and Section V. B.
105
Allison A. Vana, Note: Attorney Private Eyes: Ethical Implications of a Private
Attorney’s Decision to Surreptitiously Record Conversations, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1605,
1632 (2003).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 1631.
108
Attorney M v. Mississippi Bar, 621 So.2d 220 (Miss. 1992).
109
Id. at 221.
110
Id. at 222.
111
Id.
112
Id.
104
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Attorney M violated Rule 8.4(c) and Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules;
Attorney M subsequently appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of
Mississippi.113
The court began their analysis by observing that the Complaint
Tribunal followed the framework outlined in ABA Formal Opinion 337,
which forbade any secret recording by attorneys.114 The court disagreed
with the Complaint Tribunal’s heavy reliance on Opinion 337, because the
State of Mississippi had never formally adopted the opinion and instead
preferred to adjudicate matters on an individual basis.115 The court favored
the holding in Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar over the Committee’s
stance in Opinion 337.116
The court preferred the reasoning in Netterville because the case
produced a more applicable and flexible rule that applies to all attorneys,
instead of carving out exceptions as Opinion 337 had.117 The court found
no basis to apply a standard that treated prosecuting attorneys and private
attorneys differently.118 It noted that there are times that a recording could
be used for improper and unethical purposes, like “blackmail or to gain an
unfair advantage.”119 However, the court found no improper motive and,
therefore, Attorney M had not violated Rule 8.4 because his conduct was
not dishonest, fraudulent, deceptive, or misrepresentative in nature.120
Although the above examples appear as though Mississippi is lenient
in disciplinary actions concerning surreptitious recordings, they have
punished other attorneys for such conduct. In Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, for
example, the Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed the Chancery Court’s
decision to remove a trustee as a result of the trustee’s repeated
surreptitious recording of a co-trustee.121 The controversy arose after the
passing of Richard Wilbourn II, who left his considerable interest in
Citizens National Bank Corporation Holding Company to his wife, Deanna
Wilbourn, and their son, Richard Wilbourn III.122 The holding company
113

Id.
Attorney M, 621 So.2d at 222–23.
115
Id. at 223.
116
Attorney M, 621 So.2d at 223; see also Netterville v. Mississippi State Bar, 397
So.2d 878 (1981) (stating that surreptitious tape recording is not unethical when the act,
“considered within the context of the circumstances then existing,” does not rise to the level
of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation).
117
Attorney M, 621 So.2d at 223. See discussion supra note 71. The court recognized
that Opinion 337 only carved out exceptions for certain government employed attorneys.
118
Id. at 223.
119
Id. at 224 (stating that mere taping is not the issue, rather the determining factor is
how the attorney actually uses the tapes).
120
Id. at 224.
121
Wilbourn v. Wilbourn, 106 So.3d 360, 372 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012).
122
Id. at 363-64.
114
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shares were held in trust by Deanna and Richard III, with the main purpose
to ensure Deanna an annual income for the remainder of her life.123 In
addition to being co-trustees, Deanna and Richard III also had an attorneyclient relationship.124 Richard III was a partner of a law firm that
represented Deanna for numerous years; he had advised her on buying real
estate in Florida, created a life insurance trust for her, and advised her on a
potential lawsuit regarding Hurricane Katrina damage.125
Richard III secretly tape-recorded discussions with Deanna.126 The
court took this fact seriously, as Richard III was not only a co-trustee, but
was also Deanna’s attorney.127 The court noted that in Mississippi, the
main factors to determine whether a surreptitious recording is unethical are
the reason and manner in which the attorney uses the recordings.128 The
court of appeals agreed with the chancery judge, who determined that
Richard III intended to use the secret recordings in an attempt to have his
client declared incompetent and removed as a trustee.129 The court of
appeals affirmed the removal of Richard III as co-trustee.130 It reasoned
that an attorney who uses a secret recording to gain an unfair advantage
over his or her client has committed an unethical, and possibly illegal,
act.131 Although Richard III was not sanctioned by the Mississippi State
Bar for surreptitiously recording his client, his removal as a trustee was
directly correlated to the findings that his behavior was unethical.132
As shown, Mississippi does not have a hard and fast rule regarding
surreptitious recording. Instead, their courts determine the specific facts of
the issue at hand, the circumstances under which the recording was made,
the intent of the attorney, and the purpose of which the tapes would be
used. Only after weighing these factors does a Mississippi court determine
if a secret recording is unethical. However, as will be discussed below, not
every state is as liberal as Mississippi.

123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 364-65.
Id. at 375.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 366.
Wilbourn, 106 So.3d at 375.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 371-72.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 372.

DEMPSTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

1/27/2020 12:02 PM

SURREPTITIOUS RECORDING BY ATTORNEYS

131

B. Objective Standard Jurisdictions
1. South Carolina
Objective jurisdictions can be characterized as jurisdictions that do
not permit private attorneys to surreptitiously record their clients under any
circumstance. In these jurisdictions, attorneys who surreptitiously record
their clients are typically sanctioned for unethical behavior.
The
circumstances and facts surrounding the recording are not taken into
consideration by the courts.
Although South Carolina does not have a per se rule prohibiting
surreptitious recordings, their approach to the issue is far more rigid than
Mississippi’s. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has consistently
determined that surreptitious recording is unethical; however, it does
permit attorneys involved with a law enforcement agency to ethically
surreptitiously record.
In In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, the attorney in
question represented a client involved in a motor vehicle accident.133 The
attorney subsequently called the other driver involved in the collision,
without disclosing that he was an attorney for his client or advising the
driver that he was recording their conversation.134 The attorney attempted
to use the recording during the deposition of the driver, and opposing
counsel objected on the propriety of the recording.135 The Court held that
any time an attorney records a conversation with an adversary or potential
adversary without the consent of all parties to record, the attorney violates
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), which provides that a lawyer shall not
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation.”136
In the years since In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina created limited exceptions allowing
attorneys to record conversations.137 In In re Attorney General’s Petition,
the court carved out an exception to the rigid standard the state typically

133

In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 322 S.E.2d 667, 668 (S.C. 1984).
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 669. (Adopting ABA Formal Opinion 337, which stated that surreptitiously
recording clients is considered attorney misconduct. Note that DR 1-102(A)(4) was the
predecessor to ABA Model Rule 8.4(c). The court clarified its position in Matter of S.C.
Bar, 404 S.E.2d 513 (S.C. 1991), holding that an attorney cannot record a conversation
without the consent of all parties, regardless of the purpose for which the recording is made,
the intent of parties to the conversation, whether any confidential information is discussed,
or whether any party would gain an advantage.).
137
See discussion infra Section V. B. 1.
134
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imposes.138 There, the court held that it was permissible and therefore
ethical for an attorney to surreptitiously record a conversation, as long as
the attorney received clearance from a law enforcement agency conducting
a criminal investigation.139 However, the court noted that if an attorney
was accused of an unethical recording, the burden of proof is on the
attorney to show that the act of recording was ethical.140
The Supreme Court of South Carolina recently bolstered this standard
in In re Nolan.141 This case involved an out-of-state attorney who was
unfamiliar with South Carolina’s surreptitious recording case law.142 The
attorney hired private investigators and directed them to go to the
defendant’s company to secretly record various employees in an attempt to
capture the employees making statements regarding products produced by
the company.143 The court determined that this was an unethical recording
which violated Rule 8.4(d) of the Model Rules, because the conduct
involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.144 Furthermore,
the Court also held that the attorney violated Rule 5.3(c) of the Model
Rules because the attorney directed his investigators to act unethically.145
In general, South Carolina has an easy to follow rule regarding
surreptitious recording; unless an attorney has permission from a law
enforcement agency to record or has the permission of all parties to the
conversation, the attorney may not ethically record the conversation,
regardless of the purpose of the recording itself. This is in contrast to the
rule in Mississippi which generally allows surreptitious recordings, as long
as the recording is not used in an unethical manner. However, the standard
in South Carolina is easier to apply in practice since the framework is more
structured.
2. Colorado
Colorado generally adopts the language and assertions the Committee
set forth in Formal Opinion 337.146 In People v. Smith, the court
determined that a lawyer’s secret taping of a telephone conversation with a
138

In re Att’y Gen.’s Petition, 417 S.E.2d 526 (S.C. 1992).
Id. at 527.
140
Id. at 527.
141
In re Nolan, 796 S.E.2d 841, 842 (S.C. 2017).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.3(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
146
Vana, supra note 105, at 1618–19 (showing Opinion 337 set forth the idea that it was
impermissible for an attorney to surreptitiously record their client, their adversary, or a third
party).
139

DEMPSTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

1/27/2020 12:02 PM

SURREPTITIOUS RECORDING BY ATTORNEYS

133

former client was inherently unethical.147 Smith had a cocaine addiction
and socialized with other cocaine users.148 Some of Smith’s acquaintances
were arrested and charged with intent to sell cocaine.149 Smith agreed to
represent these individuals and throughout the representation, he engaged
in conversations with them over the telephone.150 Smith was then contacted
by the District Attorney’s office, informing him that they knew of his
addiction and believed that he was also involved in the sale of cocaine.151
After he was contacted by the District Attorney’s office, Smith withdrew
his representation of his clients and cooperated in the District Attorney’s
investigation.152 The investigation required Smith to contact his former
clients multiple times via telephone and record their conversations.153 The
Colorado Supreme Court stated that even though Smith was acting at the
District Attorney’s request, his conduct still violated Disciplinary Rule
102(A)(4), which prohibited conduct involving “dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation.”154
The court held that “undisclosed use of a recording device necessarily
involves elements of deception and trickery which do not comport with the
high standards of candor and fairness to which all attorneys are bound.”155
The court focused on the repercussions and effects of lawyers taping
former clients.156 Thus, a private attorney may not tape others as it is
inherently deceitful to do so and it would disrupt the “foundation of trust
and confidentiality that is essential to the attorney-client relationship in the
context of civil as well as criminal proceedings.”157 Colorado has a theme
of honesty, transparency, and openness in their evaluation of attorney-client
relationships; secret recordings are actions that are opposite of this theme
and thus are considered dishonest, fraudulent, and deceitful and are
therefore subject to sanctions.158
Seemingly there are three different types of jurisdictions in the topic
of secret recordings. There are jurisdictions like Mississippi that do not
have a per se rule against recordings, instead measuring each case by the
unique circumstances present and by determining the purpose of the
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1989).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 685-86.
Id. at 686.
Id.
Id.
Smith, 778 P.2d at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id. (citing People v. Selby, 606 P.2d 45, 47 (Colo. 1979).
Smith, 778 P.2d at 687.
Id.
Vana, supra note 105, at 1622–23.
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recording. Next, there are jurisdictions such as South Carolina that follow
the Committee’s guidance set forth in Opinion 337 and only carve out
exceptions for attorneys secretly recording at the request of a law
enforcement agency. Lastly, there are jurisdictions like Colorado that have
no tolerance for surreptitious recording unless that attorney is a government
attorney. The difference between a state like South Carolina and Colorado
is that the South Carolina rulings allow a private attorney to act on behalf
of a law enforcement agency, while in Colorado the attorney must be
employed by the agency, otherwise it is an ethics violation subject to
sanction.
VI. ANALYSIS
Surreptitious recording of adversaries and third parties is certainly
questionable behavior. It is evident and undeniable that it is extremely
problematic for an attorney to surreptitiously record clients. Attorneys and
clients exchange confidential communication, which is defined as
“information exchanged between two people who (1) have a relationship in
which private communications are protected by law and (2) intend that the
information be kept in confidence.”159 The reasoning of the ethics opinions
cited above rely heavily on the duty of confidentiality and the potential for
misconduct. This analysis focuses on these two factors to reveal how
surreptitious recording has the potential to cause a multitude of problems.
The duty of confidentiality is one of the most important aspects of the
attorney-client relationship. The duty of confidentiality protects a client
from an attorney’s voluntary disclosure of information gathered through the
representation of the client.160 This principle cultivates trust between the
attorney and the client; the client knows that they can talk openly and
honestly with his or her counsel and have confidence that the information
will remain out of the public view.161 The duty is important, as it allows
clients to fully inform their attorneys, which promotes rigorous and
effective representation.162
The duty of confidentiality is oftentimes confused with the attorneyclient privilege since they operate in a similar fashion.163 Attorney-client
privilege is invoked when an attorney is faced with a court order
159

2009).

Confidential Communication. NOLO’S PLAIN ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed.

160
ROGER CRAMTON, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and Government
Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 302 (1991).
161
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW.
162
EDWARD W. CLEARY, ET AL., MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
175 (2nd ed. 1972).
163
See FED. R. EVID. 502.
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demanding information communicated between the attorney and their
client.164 The duty of confidentiality is even more protective of the client,
as it forbids an attorney from revealing any information “relating to the
representation” of a client.165 The duty of confidentiality is stronger and
more protective than the attorney-client privilege as the attorney client
privilege only protects against compelled disclosure, while the duty of
confidentiality protects against any disclosure relating to the client’s
representation.166 Indeed, both of these principles are extremely similar in
nature and are concerned with the improper disclosure of information that a
client relays to their attorney.
The attorney-client privilege is a common law principle that was
formalized in Annesley v. Anglesea in England in 1743.167 The court
summarized the importance of the privilege saying
if he [the client] does not fully and candidly disclose
everything that is in his mind, which he apprehends may be
in the least relative to the affair he consults his attorney
upon, it will be impossible for the attorney properly to
serve him: therefore, to permit an attorney, whenever he
thinks fit, to betray that confidence . . . would be of the
most dangerous consequence, not only to the particular
client concerned, but to every other man who is or may be
a client.168
The court had the foresight to realize the importance of honesty and
candor between attorney and client. They recognized that an attorney who
is ignorant of certain facts will be handicapped and thus will not be able to
represent the client to their fullest capabilities. Furthermore, the court
noted that by preventing disclosure they not only protect the rights and
information of the client, but also the general public, some of whom will be
serviced by the attorney in the future.
Indeed, the concerns of Anglesea still hold true in modern
jurisprudence. In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the Court recognized the
importance of honest and frank communications between client and
counsel.169 It noted that rigorous representation serves the public good, and
that the best way to achieve proper representation is for an attorney to be

164

Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
HAZARD, supra note 21, at §10.02 OVERVIEW; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
166
Bruce M. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, THE
GOOD LAWYER 191 (David Luban ed., 1983).
167
Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Trials. 1139 (1743).
168
Id. at 1237.
169
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
165
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fully informed by their client.170 The Court quoted the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1 in support of their
belief in the attorney-client privilege.
A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts of
the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain
the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer
in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to
separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his
client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.171
Ethical Consideration 4-1 of the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility is the predecessor to Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.172
Thus, there is support that the duty of
confidentiality is firmly planted in the modern jurisprudence of this
country. It is not merely a theoretical rule that lawyers should follow, but it
is one of the most important building blocks of the attorney-client
relationship.
Although the duty of confidentiality is well established, it does not
mean that it is not without limits and boundaries.173 The difficult problem
is defining those boundaries; at what point does the duty of confidentiality
cease to apply? At what point can an attorney ethically record a client
without their consent and knowledge?
A client who discloses information to an attorney has an
understanding that the attorney will keep the information confidential;
however, there are different types of information that a client may reveal to
their attorney, which complicates the question of confidentiality. The first
type contains information that is completely outside the scope of
confidentiality and thus an attorney may ethically disclose the information
to an outside party.174 Generally, an attorney may disclose information in
170
Id.; see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (“The lawyer-client
privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the
client’s reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out.”);
see Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (recognizing the purpose of the
privilege to be “to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.”).
171
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 391 (1981).
172
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
173
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1091 (1978).
174
Landesman, supra note 166, at 203.
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this category under Rule 1.6(b) of the Model Rules.175 This category
includes information such as the intent to commit a future crime or harm
another person.176 Positive information can be disclosed without an
overhanging ethics violation; however, this is not applicable to this
comment, since the focus here is negative disclosure: information that can
damage a client, cause them to look bad in the public eye, or embarrass
them.177
The second category of confidential information is information that
lies in the grey zone, information an attorney cannot disclose except under
unique circumstances.178 All else being equal, the attorney cannot disclose
this type of information because of the duty of confidentiality. However, if
the client acts in a particular way such as committing perjury or
misrepresenting themselves to the court, their attorney can disclose certain
information to correct the record.179 Attorneys must hold information in
this category in confidence unless the client acts in a manner which permits
their attorney to disclose it.180
The final category of confidential communications is those which
cannot be disclosed under any circumstances. The ABA does not
specifically list or enumerate these communications. Attorneys must
absolutely protect the information in this category and cannot reveal it
under any set of circumstances.181
Some information is indeed not protected by the duty of
confidentiality; an attorney can break the duty to prevent future physical
harm or correct an incorrect record in court. However, most information
disclosed to an attorney will not fall under such categories; instead, it will
fall into the third category, which requires absolute protection and cannot
be revealed under any circumstances.182 It is in this context that
surreptitious recording is most problematic, as no circumstances exist to
permit an attorney to divulge such information to those outside of the
attorney-client relationship. The remainder of the comment will discuss the
various issues that an attorney would face if they were to surreptitiously
record their client.

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
Id.; see also Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1992).
Landesman, supra note 166, at 203.
Landesman, supra note 166, at 203.
Landesman, supra note 166, at 203.
Landesman, supra note 166, at 203.
Landesman, supra note 166, at 206.
Landesman, supra note 166, at 206.
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A. Timing Issues Associated with Surreptitious Recording
Even if an attorney is ethically permitted to reveal client confidences,
how does an attorney know when to tape? Attorneys, like the remainder of
the world’s population, are not mind readers nor can they predict the future.
An attorney will not know when to tape their client unless they have prior
knowledge that a client is going to specifically reveal information that is
not protected by the duty of confidentiality. It is unrealistic for a client to
advise their attorney that they will now start to say something which can be
disclosed under Rule 1.6(b). Clients will not announce that they will say
something important, implicating, or damning; they will just blurt it out.
The attorney will not have an opportunity to start a recording until after the
words are spoken. It is highly unlikely that an attorney will be able to
specifically record a conversation in which the client says something
disclosable without recording unimportant and non-disclosable (category
three) information along with it.
The obvious argument against this premise is that an attorney can
record all conversations with every client and therefore they will gather the
information they seek. An attorney could install recording equipment in
their office and ensure that every time a client walks through their door
they are recording every single word. However, this is problematic for a
few reasons. Although some jurisdictions would determine that this
behavior is ethically sound, it is highly suspect.183 The entire premise of
the attorney client relationship is one of openness and candor. A client
needs to feel that they can confide in their counsel for the purposes of their
representation. If a client were to discover their attorney was secretly
recording them, their relationship with their attorney would be irreparably
damaged, as would those of the attorney’s other clients, both past and
future. Instead of speaking their minds and offering any possible
information relating to their representation, the client will be inclined to
keep their mouth shut and disclose less information than they would
otherwise. The relationship will go from open and honest to silenced and
adversarial. The client will not wish to say anything that could possibly be
used against them and their representation will suffer.
B. Practicality Issues Associated with Surreptitious Recording
Although the Committee did not completely condemn attorneys
secretly recording their clients in Formal Opinion 01-422, it is highly
doubtful that they wish this behavior to become the norm in the legal
industry. It seems that the ABA advocates for any attorney who is
183
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recording a conversation to inform those being recorded and gain their
consent. It would go against the grain for the ABA to advocate for such
deceptive actions. There are both positive and negative consequences of
informing the client of the recording. If an attorney does not alert their
client of the recording, the client would not act any differently. The
client’s ignorance would be the benefit of the attorney; the client would
conduct themselves in a normal way, they would not suspect anything, and
they would interact with their attorney as they would any other meeting.
The client would share all pertinent information regarding their
representation and would be more inclined to tell the attorney possibly
damning or embarrassing information.
On the flip side, if an attorney were to alert their client that they are
recording, the attorney risks not getting their client’s complete honesty and
candor. The client may leave out specific details that they do not wish to
be on a verbatim recording. They might change their story to be more
pleasing or embellish on their facts. The discussion will not be frank and
honest. If clients knew that there were certain areas that were exempted
from the scope of confidentiality, clients would avoid such areas, and
would not reveal information concerning those areas.184 Often, clients
intertwine these unprotected areas with relevant information, and also omit
relevant information.185 Restrictions on the duty of confidentiality would
make individual clients cautious and would negatively affect their
representation.186
Although the ABA advised in their latest ethics opinion that secret
recording is not in and of itself unethical, this conclusion is suspect.187
Model Rule 8.4(c) states that a lawyer may not engage in deceitful
behavior.188 The premise that secretly recording a client is not deceitful is
questionable. The only way an attorney could record a client without their
knowledge is through deception.
Although attorneys are not
misrepresenting themselves, because they are not making a representation
in general, their conduct is sneaky. They have the opportunity to alert the
client of the recording, and their choice not to do so could be classified as
withholding important information. Although not deceit by definition, it
seems that there is a certain amount of avoidance; and through that
avoidance there is some misrepresentation and deceit.
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C. Evidentiary Issues Associated with Surreptitious Recording
An attorney has a duty of loyalty to their clients; they have to protect
confidential information at all times unless the client gives permission to
release the information.189 This duty extends not only to the spoken words;
it also includes all documents memorializing this confidential
information.190 If an attorney were to surreptitiously record clients, they
would create a full and complete record of the conversation.191 The tape
would be a verbatim record, complete with the exact tone, emotions, and
phrases of the client.
Clients do not necessarily know what information an attorney needs
for proper representation.192 Therefore, when a client is recounting facts or
their story to their attorney, the pertinent information will be mixed in with
irrelevant information. The topics and subject matter of this irrelevant
information may be of an embarrassing nature or information that a client
shares in confidence, knowing that their attorney is not permitted to share
this information with others.193 By tape recording a client, an attorney not
only gathers the important information necessary for representation, but
also collects this irrelevant information and memorializes it. If an attorney
is taking the meeting with handwritten notes, it is unlikely that an attorney
will even bother writing down this irrelevant information and will only
focus on the important facts of the story, simply for brevity’s sake. By
creating a verbatim record, all of the information is on the tape. If the
recording were to get into the wrong hands, not only would the information
concerning the representation be in the public eye, but this irrelevant
information could also be under public scrutiny. Indeed, the ABA in
Opinion 01-422 foreshadowed this problem, as taped evidence could be
subjected to misuse and abuse the duty of confidentiality.194
As seen in the Trump-Cohen relationship, if their conversation about
the payments was made without a tape recording and in short memorialized
notes, there would be less hard evidence of the conversation even taking
place. Ignoring the obvious illegality of these payments and the use of an
attorney’s services in furtherance of these payments, the existence of a
verbatim record damages the client’s reputation and has the potential to
create more legal problems in the future. An attorney’s purpose is to serve
their clients with the strongest representation and skill. By recording a
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client and materializing sensitive information, the attorney ignores and
neglects their purpose. They are necessarily harming their client as there is
a possibility that this recording is put into the pubic scope for all to see. A
traditional handwritten note or unrecorded conversation protects client
information as there is less likelihood that the material will be made public
and connected specifically to a particular client. This method protects the
client’s interests better than any recorded conversation ever could.
D. Summary
It is difficult to conclude that surreptitious recording is on its face
ethical. Although the ABA permits it in certain circumstances, it seems
deceptive and deceitful. In practice, there is no uniform answer to the
question, different states view the issue differently; some allow it, while
others strictly forbid it with no exceptions. However, in the end, the
question truly boils down to individual attorneys and their judgment. The
attorney must decide only after considering all the circumstances and
possible consequences. They must be cognizant that surreptitiously
recording their client could potentially irreparably damage the attorneyclient relationship. However, if the attorney determines that the situation
requires such surreptitious recording, the attorney must confirm that there
is a proper motive for the action and ensure that the client’s representation
and confidences remain intact. To do otherwise would be to abuse the
relationship and jeopardize the client’s confidence in their representation.
VII. PROPOSAL
A. Legislative Solution
There are two possible remedies that could solve the ethics issue
discussed in this comment. The first solution is quite simple. The ethical
issues surrounding single-party consent jurisdictions are numerous as
explained above. The most straightforward solution to nullify these ethical
issues is to amend the law of recording itself. If state legislatures were to
amend their laws to mandate consent of all parties of a conversation, the
ethics issues would vanish. As previously explained, Rule 8.4(b) of the
Model Rules states that it is professional misconduct to “commit a criminal
act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”195 Therefore, if surreptitious
recording was outlawed by statute, it would necessarily be an ethics
violation if an attorney were to record their client without their consent.
However, it is unlikely for this to occur as the federal government and 38
195
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individual states are single-party consent jurisdictions.196
B. American Bar Association Solution
The ABA could resolve the issue of surreptitious recording in two
ways. The first method is to release a new Formal Opinion on surreptitious
recording that provides specified guidance on when and where an attorney
could ethically record. If the ABA were to provide clear cut examples it
would clarify the issue surrounding the problem.
The second method the ABA could undertake is through Model Rule
amendment and annotation. If the ABA were to specifically amend and
annotate Rule 8.4(c) to include surreptitious recording as deceptive
conduct, the ABA could change the way surreptitious recording is viewed.
If surreptitious recording of clients was considered deceptive, to do so
would violate the Model Rules and thus attorneys would be vulnerable to
sanctions or penalties.
For either of these options to work, state supreme courts would have
to adopt the ABA’s position. In the first method, the state supreme courts
would have to adopt the new Formal Opinion. Since ABA Formal
Opinions are not binding on any court, the states would have to voluntarily
adopt the new opinion and use the opinion in attorney misconduct
hearings.197 However, it is highly unlikely that all jurisdictions will adopt
such an opinion. As explained above, numerous states have different
methodologies when analyzing the ethics of surreptitious recordings, and it
is unlikely that these jurisdictions will abandon their precedent because the
ABA promulgated something new.198
The second proposed method runs into a similar problem. Even if the
ABA were to promulgate an amendment to Model Rule 8.4(c), the
individual states would still have the discretion to adopt the amendment.
States do not necessarily need to adopt all of the Rules verbatim and can
often modify them to their specific needs and requirements.199 Thus, even
if the ABA were to amend the Rule, a state could strike the modification
regarding surreptitious recordings.
Ultimately it seems that any change regarding the act of surreptitious
recording must come from the state’s willingness to change. Since the
ABA does not have any enforcement powers of their own, they are to an
extent hindered in their ability to promulgate ethical rules or opinions
which may be unpopular amongst a group of states. As such, unless
196
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individual states change their views on the ethics of surreptitious recording
or change their substantive laws, it is unlikely that any tangible change will
occur.

